Introduction
Unitary states such as the People's Republic of China (hereinafter given as China) and Finland are much less monolithic in terms of institutional design than the reference to the unitary nature of the state indicates. Although this may be a surprise to the outside observer, the flexibility in the internal state structure signals an implementation of the wish in both countries to recognize the existence of different minorities and population groups inside their national territories.
In China, the recognized minority ethnic groups are together number 55. Under the Constitution of China, two different forms of local people' congresses (LPCs) are recognized for the purposes of the minority ethnic groups. The first form of LPC is created under Article 116 of the Constitution of China, as specified in Article 66 of the Legislation Law and Article 19 of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. This form of local autonomy is characterized by the possibility to exercise so-called law-varying powers, which means that national law can be modified through a decision of an LPC of this kind provided that the national authorities confirm the local variant of the law. The second form of LPC is created under Article 100 of the Constitution of China, as specified in Article 66 of the Legislation Law and Articles 7 and 43 of the Organic Law on the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments. This form of local autonomy is empowered to pass by-laws that implement national law. The Finnish Constitution, in addition to identifying Finnish and Swedish as national languages and establishing linguistic and cultural autonomy for the Sami, opens up a recognition in Article 17(3) of the Constitution of other minorities, too, with the Roma and those who use sign language explicitly mentioned.
While the truly autonomous nature of the two forms of the LPCs may be doubted, Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution opens up for so-called Special Administrative Regions as established by law. This possibility has been used in two cases, Hong Kong and Macau, after China concluded an international treaty with the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Portugal, on the other, about granting a high degree of autonomy to each of the areas. The international treaties are entitled Joint Declarations, and they make provision for the distribution of legislative powers between mainland China and the two areas that used to be governed by the two colonial powers. In several respects, the status of the Åland Islands in Finland was and is similar, in particular during from 1920-1994, when the formal constitutional acts of Finland did not contain any provision about the autonomy or self-government of the Åland Islands. There was constitutional silence in spite of the fact that there had been an international commitment on behalf of the Åland Islands by Finland through the 1921 Åland Islands Settlement under the auspices of the League of Nations. The current Constitution of Finland establishes an autonomy arrangement for the Åland Islands, with powers that are not quite as extensive as those of Hong Kong and Macau but with an entrenchment that is more elaborate.
Because the Chinese commitment with respect to Hong Kong and Macau is temporary, extending over 50 years until 2047 and 2049, the future challenge lies in the constitutional regulation of the position of the two autonomous areas after the international commitment expires. Finland has some experience with the potential of expiry of an international commitment: the international organization that undertook the supervision of the commitment concerning the Åland Islands, the League of Nations, disappeared in the wake of the Second World War. How can the disappearance of an international autonomy commitment be dealt with by a state? In which ways can open constitutional regulation of autonomous areas be positivized in the constitution of a country and how has this been done in a comparative perspective? Could the method of incorporating provisions concerning the Åland Islands in the Constitution of Finland be relevant for regulating the future position of Hong Kong and Macau in the Chinese state structure?
In addition to these similarities in law, some similarities in fact can also be referred to. The autonomous areas are of a similar size in the national context, around or less than 0.5% of the population, which means that the national governments are probably not viewing these areas as primary governmental matters in their everyday politics. As a consequence, the areas run the risk of being forgotten about in the
